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Resources to fight the War for Independence from Great Britain (1775-1783) were to be 
provided to the U.S. Congress by the individual states based on each state’s population 
share in the united colonies. Congressional spending, however, largely flowed to where 
the theater of war was located. Thus a geographic imbalance in revenue and spending 
arose. Because much of the spending was through issuing paper money, geographic 
variation in inflation as well as in general economic activity resulted. This in turn 
affected the relative strength of each state’s attachment to the union with ramifications on 
maintaining political unity. 
  
  The united colonies assembled in a Second Continental Congress on 10 May 1775 in 
Philadelphia to discuss a common response to the conflict between Massachusetts and the British 
Crown. The battles of Lexington and Concord had already occurred and the British forces which 
had retreated to Boston were now under siege by Massachusetts militia. Resources and men were 
already on the move from other states to support the Massachusetts revolutionaries. Congress, 
with no legal authority, decided to make itself the de facto united revolutionary government. 
Congress’ immediate problem was marshaling resources for a united effort against the British 
occupying Boston. The provision of these resources helped sustain the near year-long siege of, 
and final expulsion of British forces from, Boston. In the spring of 1775, independence was not 
yet the dominant sentiment. It would take a full year of open warfare—victory in the battle for 
Boston, the pending battle for New York, and the campaigns against British Canada—before 
Congress would declare independence on 4 July 1776 (Tindall 1988, pp. 210-20). It quickly 
became clear that Congressional marshalling of resources for a united effort against the British 
was not a one-off exercise but would need to be continued for some time. 
  As these events unfolded, Congress had to improvise a fiscal policy and do so under 
extreme wartime duress and questionable political legitimacy. It was an improvised extralegal   2
revolutionary body without any constitutional structure of organization. As such, it exercised 
power by common consent of the states as represented by their delegates in Congress. The 
Articles of Confederation were not laid before Congress until November of 1777, and they were 
not ratified by the states until March 1781 (Journals of the Continental Congress [JCC hereafter] 
vol. 9, pp. 907-28, vol. 19, p. 233; Tindall 1988, pp. 247-48).
1  
  As a more-or-less voluntary assembly of states, Congress decided that resources—men, 
money, and material—required to support the united war effort against the British would be 
provided by the states to Congress in proportion to each states’ economic strength and ability. 
Congress had no separate power to directly tax the public or the states. Nor did Congress have 
power to enforce compliance by the states of its requisition requests. Provision of requisitioned 
resources by the states was basically voluntary. A sense of fairness in resource extraction by 
Congress was likely needed to maintain political unity under such a voluntary system. By 
contrast, where these resources would be spent was largely determined by the exigencies of war. 
As such, an imbalance between where resources were extracted and where they were spent—
from which states they came versus in which states they were accumulated—was likely to occur.  
  The primary goal of this paper is to describe and quantify this geographic imbalance 
between Congressional revenue and spending flows over the first five years of the War for 
Independence (1775-1780)—the years dominated by the emission of Congress’ Continental 
Dollar paper money. Part of this effort entails estimating a breakdown of Congressional spending 
by source, type, and location for each year as well as establishing the distribution of resource 
demands requested of each state by Congress.  
Much of the spending by Congress during the first five years of the war was in the form 
of a paper money that Congress had created—the Continental Dollar. This money was structured   3
as a zero-interest bearer bond that the states were required to redeem in the near future (Grubb 
2008c). A secondary goal of this paper is to estimate what share of Congressional spending took 
this form and to tally up and evaluate Congress’ yearly budgets with respect to deficits and 
surpluses during the era spanned by the Continental Dollar. This in turn is used to reevaluate the 
fiscal/monetary course of the war and, in conjunction with the location of spending, to explore 
the geographic imbalance across the states of these massive monetary injections and the 
localized price disturbances they may have caused. This form of Congressional resource creating 
and spending collapsed in 1780, which explains the end year of the current study. Future work 
will take this analysis through the final years of the war (1781-1783), a period that presents a 
different and more complicated set of accounting challenges.  
State adherence to Congressional resource requests is used to construct an index of state 
commitment to the union. The geographic imbalance in Congressional revenue requests versus 
spending flows is then used to explain the variation in this commitment. The extent that 
confederations and federalism depend on geographic balance in national fiscal/monetary policy, 
even during wartime emergencies involving patriotic exuberance, and how fragile such unions 
can be in the face of such imbalances is an important consideration for evaluating the early 
history of U.S. political survival. This paper explores a different perspective of the American 
Revolution by focusing on the initial construction of fiscal federalism and the problems it may 
have created both during the Revolution and into the early Republic. Being exploratory, the hope 
is that this paper will help stimulate scholarly interest to develop this line of research further.  
The Geographic Distribution of Congressional Resource Demands 
  In June of 1775, one month after convening, Congress had committed itself to a united 
military effort against the British in Boston. It had to raise substantial sums of money to finance   4
this effort, namely to pay monthly wages to soldiers, provision them, and provide military arms 
for the Continental army as well as to meet sundry expenses that accompany a functioning 
central government. It could not directly tax the public or the states, and it had no resources or 
assets of it own. The states were not in a position to immediately deliver money to Congress. 
Thus, Congress had to borrow. As a government with questionable legitimacy, it could not easily 
borrow from foreigners or even directly from its own people. Thus, it resolved to borrow from 
itself, namely from its constituent states, as a united entity rather than merely sanction separate 
state borrowings with some sort of national endorsement (Grubb 2008c).  
Congress accomplished this borrowing by issuing zero-interest bearer bonds, called 
Continental Dollars, which the states as assembled in Congress pledged to redeem and return to 
the Congressional treasury to be burned. Congress initially authorized $2 million on 22 June 
1775 with another million authorized on 25 July 1775. The redemption value in specie was 
printed on the face of each Continental Dollar and the redemption or maturity date was set by 
legislation. The states were not required to start redeeming these bearer bonds until December 
1779 nor finish redeeming them before December 1782. Future emissions would not have to be 
redeemed until as late as 1797. Congress also asked the states to make Continental Dollars a 
legal tender within their respective states in order to force acceptance of them as Congressional 
agents spent them to acquire resources and pay soldiers—a request to which states complied 
(Grubb 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; JCC vol. 2, pp. 221-23, vol. 3, p. 458, vol. 13, p. 64; 
Newman 1997, pp. 33-35, 59-68). 
   In this initial action Congress also established how the states would contribute resources 
to Congress, in this case what share of the total Continental Dollars issued by Congress each 
state would be required to redeem. The resolution stated:    5
That each colony provide ways and means to sink its proportion of the bills 
[Continental Dollars] ordered to be emitted by this Congress, in such manner as may be 
most effectual and best adapted to the conditions, circumstances, and usual mode of 
levying taxes in such colony.  
That the proportion or quota of each colony be determined according to the 
number of Inhabitants of all ages, including negroes and mulattoes in each colony; But as 
this cannot, at present, be ascertained, that the quotes of the several colonies be settled for 
the present, as follows, to undergo a revision and correction, when the list of each colony 
is obtained (JCC vol. 2, p. 221). 
 
The percentage contributions are listed in Table 1, column 2. Georgia was not yet in Congress 
and so received no quota. The basic idea was that the total resources needed for the united war 
effort as executed by Congress would be supplied by the states in proportion to each state’s 
relative economic strength and ability. How to assess that relative economic strength was not 
obvious or easy to accurately estimate. The initial choice was by relative population shares in the 
union, in part because it was highly correlated with economic strength and ability to deliver 
resources, but mostly because it was an easy-to-measure expedient. Even relative population 
shares, as indicated in the resolution quoted above, were not known with exact certainty. 
[Place Table 1 Here] 
  Congress adopted the Articles of Confederation 15 November 1777. Article 8 of the 
Articles stated that: 
All charges of war and all other expenses, that shall be incurred for the common 
defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States, in Congress assembled, 
shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states, 
in proportion to the value of all land within each State, granted to or surveyed for any 
person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated 
according to such mode as the United States, in Congress assembled, shall, from time to 
time, direct and appoint. 
The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and 
direction of the legislatures of the several states, within the time agreed upon by the 
United States, in Congress assembled (JCC vol. 9, pp. 913-14). 
 
Thus, by mid-November 1777 relative land value including the improvements made on the land 
across the states was established as the criterion for determining what share of total resources   6
demanded by Congress each state would be required to provide. While the Articles would not be 
ratified by the states until March 1781, its ratification basically legitimized the status quo in that 
from 15 November 1777 Congress operated under its auspices (Tindall 1988, p. 248). However, 
it is unclear whether the relative land-value criterion for apportioning resources to be supplied to 
Congress from among the states was ever implemented. The lack of accurate information on 
relative land values including improvements made on the land and the difficulty of obtaining 
such information under wartime circumstances may have made the criterion unusable.  
On 18 April 1783 Congress formally switched back to using relative population shares 
among the states as the apportionment criterion, albeit with slaves now counted as only three-
fifths of a person. This change was also made retroactive in application. The revision revoked the 
language in paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Articles of Confederation and replaced it with: 
all charges of war and all other expenses, that have been or shall be incurred for the 
common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States, in Congress 
assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the 
several states in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and 
inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term 
of years, and three-fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing 
description, except Indians, not paying taxes, in each State; which number shall be 
triennially taken and transmitted to the United States in Congress assembled, in such 
mode as they shall direct and appoint (JCC vol. 24, pp. 260-61). 
 
  What criteria were actually in use to apportion Congressional resource demands among 
the states is assessed in Table 1, which presents the percentage distribution across the states of 
several specific Congressional requests and compares them with the modern estimate of the 
population distribution across the states in 1780 (column 1). Columns 2 and 7 present 
distributions of Continental Dollars to be redeemed—the first and last distribution of said 
mentioned by Congress. Columns 3 and 8 present distributions of non-Continental Dollar   7
revenue requests—one from 1777 and one from 1783. Lastly, columns 4, 5, and 6 present 
distributions of troop requests from the states to fill the ranks of the national Continental army.  
The comparisons show that while each distribution is slightly different, and apparently 
randomly so, they are all basically consistent with the distributions being based on each state’s 
population share in the union. Columns 2 and 8 were supposed to be based on the population 
distribution with the only difference being that column 8 but not column 2 was to be based on 
counting slaves as three-fifths of a person. Yet, it is difficult to see a systematic difference 
between the distributions in columns 2 and 8. Columns 3 through 7 were set under the auspices 
of the Articles of Confederation which was supposed to use improved land value as the criterion 
for apportionment. Yet, it is hard to see a systematic difference across these columns and 
between these columns and columns 2 and 8. Finally, it is hard to see any systematic difference 
across any of these resource distributions established by Congress and the modern estimate of the 
distribution of population across the states in 1780. 
While the evidence in Table 1 indicates that throughout the war Congress demanded that 
resources and revenues be provided by the states in proportion to that state’s population share in 
the union, Congress did not know with great exactitude what those shares were, certainly not at 
the level of the modern estimate of population shares (column 1). This lack of exact knowledge 
may explain some of the seemingly random variation across the distributions. States may have 
sought adjustments from year to year in their Congressional apportionments.  
That said it is still interesting to compare what Congress thought the shares should be 
with the modern estimates of those shares, i.e. compare column 1 with the other columns. 
Requests were set consistently higher for Massachusetts, Maryland, and South Carolina, and 
lower for New York, Delaware, and Georgia, than what they should have been. On average,   8
requests were set slightly higher for New Hampshire and Connecticut, and slightly lower for 
Virginia and North Carolina, than what they should have been. For several states both in the 
North and in the South, the distributions track their white-population-only share, while for other 
states they track their total population share, in the union. The cases of New York and Georgia 
may also reflect the fact that large portions of these two states, i.e. their most important 
economic areas, were occupied by the British during a substantial portion of the war and so they 
may have been excused from their full share. The other cases probably represent just 
misestimates of population totals by Congress. In conclusion, Congressional resource demands 
from the states throughout the war can be taken as apportioned by state population shares in the 
union. In other words, national revenue and resources were to be extracted by population and 
thus geographically by population location. 
Congressional Wartime Spending: Location and Source 
  Congressional resource extraction was pro-rated by population and thus geographically 
based on population location within the union. Congressional spending, however, was driven by 
military necessity and so targeted geographically at the theaters of war. These theaters of war 
were not spread evenly across the states or across the population of the union. They were 
regionally if not locally focused, moving geographically over time as military strategy changed. 
Table 2 tracks the location of the major theaters of war. Roughly, the war moved from north to 
south. The first year of war, April 1775 through April 1776, was waged largely in New England 
with Boston being the major focus, but with smaller campaigns waged in northern New England 
and into Canada. The next four years of war, May 1776 through May 1780, were waged almost 
exclusively in the Middle States—between the environs of New York City and Philadelphia with 
one major engagement in upstate New York. Thereafter, the war turned to the Southern States,   9
but on a smaller scale than what had gone before. The main American army would not travel into 
the Southern States to fight until after August of 1781. 
[Place Table 2 Here] 
  Congressional spending in this period was primarily in the paper money it created—the 
Continental Dollar. The muddled history of Congressional emissions of Continental Dollars has 
been recently straightened out and the corrected amounts and time path of these emissions are 
given in Table 3 (Grubb 2008b). If Congressional spending exclusively followed the theater of 
war, then approximately $10 million Continental Dollars (face value) were injected into the New 
England economy, principally in the Boston area, during the first year of the war with little 
thereafter. The remaining $190 million Continental Dollars (face value), emitted between May 
1776 and November 1779, were injected into the economies of the Middle States, excluding New 
York City which was occupied by the British for most of the period. Continental Dollars were 
not injected into the economies of the Southern States.  
[Place Table 3 Here] 
This crude approximation of spending flows highlights the issue of geographic 
fiscal/monetary imbalance. Throughout this period, the Southern States received far less 
Congressional spending compared with the resource and revenue flows, or future responsibility 
for revenue flows, demanded of them by Congress. This imbalance was also true for New 
England after the first year of the war. By contrast, the Middle States, after the first year of the 
war, received far more Congressional spending than what they owed Congress in return. This 
geographic imbalance in Congressional revenue demands versus spending flows may have 
eroded the commitment to the union by the Southern States, and to a lesser extent the New 
England States, compared with that of the Middle States.   10
In addition, given the hyperinflation that accompanied the escalating emissions of 
Continental Dollars, particularly after mid-1776, the imbalance in fiscal spending by Congress 
across regions suggests that this hyperinflation was initially felt and likely more severely felt for 
some time in the Middle States compared with either the Southern States or New England.
2  
Efforts to reform Congress’ Continental Dollar monetary policy, namely to somehow revalue the 
currency or alter how revenue quotas in Continental Dollars were to be paid, would have been 
most beneficial to the Middle States and such efforts should have been pushed by those states.
3 
This crude approximation can be refined by showing that Continental Dollar paper 
currency dominated Congressional monetary spending and so could have had the hypothesized 
monetary effects on regional prices. Table 4 estimates the source of Congressional monies spent 
from 1775 through 1779. While the exact amount and yearly placement of domestic loans as well 
as foreign loans and gifts cannot be determined with perfect certainty, the general pattern can be 
taken with some confidence. From 1775 through 1779 Continental Dollar currency represented 
approximately 77% of the monies spent by Congress. It was 100% in the first two years. In other 
words, the first five years of the war were fought on the back of the Continental Dollar. As such, 
these massive monetary injections, if regionally targeted, could have produced strong regional 
differences, at least in the short-run, in national currency inflation. 
[Place Table 4 Here] 
  Having established the dominance of spending in Continental Dollar currency, the above 
approximation on the geographic imbalance of this spending can be further refined by showing 
that in fact the majority of Congressional spending actually flowed to where the theater of war 
was located. While harder to establish conclusively, a strong case can be made for such a flow. A 
first stab can be taken by looking at the salary or monthly pay of soldiers in the Continental   11
army—annualized to get an expected yearly cost. Because the vast majority of Continental 
troops, those at and below the rank of captain, were likely to be located where the theater of war 
was, their total expense can give an impression of where Continental Dollars were flowing. 
Table 5 provides these estimates and shows that around 43 to 46% of all the Continental Dollars 
authorized by Congress in 1776 and 1777 can be accounted for as just monthly salary flowing to 
soldiers in the field. The numbers are lower in 1775, 1778, and 1779, being 23, 10, and 5%, 
respectively. These numbers are indicative of a substantial flow of Continental Dollar currency 
going narrowly into where the theater of war was located. While tantalizing, a fuller accounting 
of Congressional wartime spending is needed to strengthen the case. 
[Place Table 5 Here] 
Congressional Wartime Spending By Type of Expense 
  A full accounting of Congressional spending by type of expense for each year of the war 
is hard to find. As far as I know, only one such accounting exists. It was prepared by Henry 
Knox, Secretary of War in the first Washington administration, in 1790 and was included in a 
document compiled by Joseph Nourse, registrar of the Treasury, for Congress explaining the 
“receipts and expenditures of public monies during the administration of the finances by Robert 
Morris.” This report has often been overlooked, perhaps because it was made by the Secretary of 
War, Henry Knox—a relatively obscure person to most Americans of today.
4  
Knox, however, may be the most underappreciated revolutionary hero and founding 
father within the current scholarly literature. He was there at the beginning of hostilities and 
quickly rose to command Washington’s artillery corps and was a key advisor to Washington on 
strategy, logistics, and supplies. In some ways he was Washington’s right-hand man, and 
Washington viewed him as critical to his military success. In addition, Knox became a principal   12
in organizing ordnance supplies, including the foundation and running of armories during the 
war at Springfield, Massachusetts and Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 
After the revolution, Knox was put in charge of the War Department under the 
Confederation government and then became the only department head that was held over into the 
first Washington administration under the new U.S. Constitution as Washington’s Secretary of 
War (Puls 2008). He and Joseph Nourse were the two longest, continuous serving administration 
appointees from the end of the war into the 1790s. Finally, from the beginning of the revolution 
into the early 1790s, the war office was extensively involved in the disbursement of 
Congressional spending authorizations, whereas the Congressional Treasury was more in charge 
of managing the revenue and finance side of the ledger. Henry Knox was in the right place to 
observe Congressional spending and had been continuously and directly involved in these 
spending issues longer than any other administrator, civilian or military.  
As such, Knox’s 1790 report should not only carry considerable weight in any assessment 
of Congressional wartime spending but is doubly important in that the U.S. War Office and all its 
records were destroyed by fire in November of 1800. Knox’s report, being imbedded in Nourse’s 
report to Congress in 1790, is as far as I can tell the only surviving account of the record of 
Congressional spending from 1775 through 1781 kept by the War Office.
5  It forms the basis for 
what follows. 
  Knox’s report listed between 11 and 14 categories or types of spending for each year of 
the war—1775 being included in 1776 as Congressional spending on the war did not begin until 
late June of 1775. From 1775 into 1780 amounts were kept in Continental Dollar units of 
account (Grubb 2008b, pp. 285-86). Table 6 presents Knox’s data for 1775 through 1780 by year 
in percentages spent by category out of the total spending listed that year. Knox’s data are   13
slightly rearranged by consolidating some categories so that only 12 are listed and to group the 
categories by whether the spending was more or less targeted into the current theater of war—
thus trying to get at the issue of geographic spending imbalances by region.  
[Place Table 6 Here] 
  While Table 5 estimated the expected yearly cost of monthly pay just to the Continental 
army, at the rank of captain and below, and found it to be a substantial component of 
Congressional spending through 1777, Knox’s first category in Table 6 reports the actual 
spending on all pay plus recruiting costs and “other contingencies” of the Continental army. It 
shows that direct army personnel and contingency expenses dominated Congressional spending 
through 1777, and remained sizable thereafter—coming in second behind military supplies (the 
Commissary and Quartermaster categories) after 1777. Interestingly, direct army pay dominated 
Congressional spending through 1777, thereafter it was the cost of supplying the army with 
provisions and equipment that dominated Congressional spending—representing well over half 
the budget in the years after 1777 (Carp 1984, pp. 17-135). 
Direct military pay was not the only budget item that was likely to be war-theater specific 
spending. Because of logistics and transport costs, supplying the army with food, clothing, 
equipment, and other necessary support materials was largely a local or at least regional affair 
(Carp 1984, pp. 53-135). Thus, when the Commissary, Quartermaster, Special Expeditions, and 
Clothing, Hospital, and Prisoner Departments are included with the army pay category (the first 
5 categories in Table 6), the share of total Congressional spending that was likely targeted 
narrowly at the region where the theater of war was located amounted to two-thirds in 1775-
1776, rose to three-quarters by 1777, and peaked at 90% of the budget in 1779. These numbers 
are likely biased low because the largest spending category not included among the war-theater   14
specific categories was “advances to the states.” This category included some states that were 
within the current theater of war. Thus, separating that category into war-theater versus non-war-
theater spending would increase the war-theater spending percentage (research still in progress).  
Congressional Spending: Totally Up the Sources 
Knox’s report tallies total Congressional spending per year in Continental Dollar units of 
account (reported in Table 6). Assuming Knox’s totals are the true totals, comparing them with 
the authorized emissions of Continental Dollars by Congress within the same approximate time 
frame indicates that Continental Dollars once authorized and printed were likely rapidly spent. 
The Congressional treasury was constantly empty of Continental Dollars. Congressional 
authorization of new emissions of paper money could not keep up with spending. This has never 
been shown before, though many have suspected it. In part, this explains the explosion in the 
Continental Dollar money supply and the resulting hyperinflation. Remember, no Continental 
Dollars were required to be redeemed by the states and returned to the Congressional treasury, 
where they were to be burnt, before 1780. 
While the deficit in Continental Dollar currency needed to meet current spending was 
small through 1776—being only $127,447, it ballooned to over $8.4 million in 1777 and just 
under $3.5 million in 1778. After that it exploded to crises levels—being over $51 million in 
1779 and over $82 million in 1780. Much of this change was driven by the expanding share of 
the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments in the Congressional spending budget. Military 
supplies, not men, were breaking the budget. How were these deficits made up? 
  The remaining part of Table 6 attempted to account for how these deficits in Continental 
Dollars were covered—something that has not be charted well before. The evidence is fragile 
and sketchy, yet of some interest and generally coherent. First, domestic borrowing, while   15
relatively small, helped reduce the deficit dramatically in the early years, yielding a deficit of 
only about $1 million in 1777 and then even putting the budget into surplus by $1.2 million in 
1778. Thereafter, however, domestic borrowing was not enough to keep the deficit from 
ballooning, yielding deficits of about $30 million in 1779 and $70 million in 1780.  
  Foreign loans and gifts may have helped reduce these remaining deficits. This is more 
difficult to determine because it is not known how much of these foreign loans and gifts were in 
cash given to the Congressional treasury that found their way into Knox’s accounting of 
Congressional spending. Foreign loans and gifts that were in the form of direct goods or credits 
in Europe seem unlikely to have been included in Knox’s spending tally. A biased low estimate 
of the residual deficit can be made by assuming that all foreign loans and gifts were cash that the 
treasury could spend. Under this assumption, the Congressional budget, using Knox’s spending 
data, was in good shape through 1778, basically being in a small surplus from 1776-1778. 
Thereafter, the residual deficits mounted, being $2.3 million in 1779 and $47.5 million in 1780.  
  While the exactitude of the accounting cannot be relied on, the general pattern over time 
and approximate magnitudes appear sound. What it indicates is that a budgetary fiscal/monetary 
crisis was held in check well into 1778 and then rapidly escalated thereafter. The residual deficit 
in these latter years, especially after 1778, was largely made up by confiscation of supplies and 
services. Paper IOUs, quartermaster notes, certificates, and warrants were handed out to the 
lucky ones whose goods and services were requisitioned, legally impressed, or just taken. These 
sums appear large. A conservative estimate using the data in Table 6 is that about $50 million in 
current Continental Dollar unit-of-account value of these IOUs were used to balance the budget 
in 1779-1780. This is consistent with the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments having   16
risen to dominate the lion’s share of Congressional spending after 1778. Again, this spending 
was largely focused on where the theater of war was located (Carp 1984, pp. 53-135). 
State Commitment to the Union 
  Congressional spending largely flowed to the theater of war, yet Congressional resources, 
both men and money, were to be drawn from the states based on the states’ relative population 
share in the union. This imbalance in where the resources were to come from and were they were 
to be applied may have affected a state’s commitment to the union. States or regions that were to 
provide more to Congress than they were to receive from Congress may have had their 
commitment to the union weakened and vice versa. 
  Measures of state commitment to the union are constructed and used to create an index of 
that commitment. The goal is to see if these measures correlate with the regional locus of 
Congressional spending, i.e. those regions who received disproportionately more Congressional 
spending being more committed to the union. In the period 1775 through 1780, the Southern 
States received a relatively low share of Congressional spending whereas the Middle States 
received a relatively high share of Congressional spending. The New England States fell 
somewhere in between—relatively high in 1775-1776 and perhaps moderately high thereafter 
sustained by the increased spending on military supplies in the Congressional budget.  
  Three measures of state commitment to the union are constructed. The first captures how 
well each state filled its quota of men to be provided to the national Continental army from 1777 
through 1780, i.e. through the period dominated by Congressional spending via Continental 
Dollar paper money. This information comes from the 1790 report by the Secretary of War and 
is reproduced in slightly altered form in Table 7. Each state’s quota of men to be provided was 
set roughly proportional to each state’s population in the union (see Table 1 above).    17
[Place Table 7 here] 
The second measure captures military resource commitment unrelated to the first 
measure which was based on population quotas and is used to get any difference in commitment 
to revolution per se versus commitment to the union. This measure takes estimates of the total 
amounts of troops raised by each state (both local militia and soldiers put into the national 
Continental army) and uses the Continental army portion relative to total troops raised as a 
measure of state commitment to the union relative to state commitment to revolution. This 
measure covers 1775 through 1780—again through the period dominated by Congressional 
spending via Continental Dollar paper money. This information also comes from the 1790 report 
by the Secretary of War, Henry Knox, and is reproduced in slightly altered form in Table 8.  
[Place Table 8 Here] 
  The third measure captures the financial commitment by each state to the union through 
the end of the war—to 1784—in terms of the extent to which each state redeemed its quota of 
Continental Dollars that Congress spent from 1775 through 1779. This quota was set roughly 
proportional to each state’s population in the union, and states were not required to start filling 
their quota until after November of 1779 (see Table 1 above). Not much action to further fill this 
quota occurred after 1784 until after mid-1786 when it became clear that some general reckoning 
of accounts between the states and Congress would occur in the near future (Grubb 2008a). This 
measure along with the first two described above are reported in Table 9 by state. Therein un-
weighted averages by measure per region are also reported along with an index of commitment 
constructed as a simple un-weighted arithmetic average of the three individual measures. 
[Place Table 9 Here]   18
    While there are some notable outliers on some measures for some states in some regions, 
the general pattern of the index across regions is consistent with the ranking of Congressional 
spending flows by region. The Southern States were the least committed to the union and also 
received a relative low share of Congressional spending. The Middle States who likely received 
the highest share of Congressional spending were also the most committed states to the union. 
New England was almost as committed to the union as the Middle States which, given that they 
received a moderately-high share of Congressional spending, may not be surprising. 
  Interesting intra-regional differences exist. For example, the Chesapeake States 
(Maryland and Virginia) were on balance more committed to the union than the Carolinas among 
the Southern States, and Rhode Island was less committed to the union on balance than the other 
New England States. Considerable differences across measures also exist. For example, the 
second measure indicates that the Chesapeake States were as committed to the union as the 
Middle States, but both groups were less committed than the New England States—sans Rhode 
Island. Such patterns indicate that there may still be a substantial role for revolutionary fervor 
and sacrifice to a larger cause in explaining commitment to a “nation” as opposed to 
commitment just to one’s own colony. Congressional resources were predominantly flowing into 
the Middle States from mid-1776 through 1780, yet New England—sans Rhode Island—and the 
Chesapeake States maintained high levels of sacrifice and commitment to the union. Finally, 
regarding the commitment to redeeming Congress’ spending of paper Continental Dollars, the 
Middle States along with the most northern of the New England States were the most committed 
to the union relative to the Southern States and the most southern of the New England States. 
  Certainly there are other causes for these patterns of state commitment to the union than 
just the imbalance of Congressional resource/revenue inflows versus spending outflows. For   19
example, military commitment to the union is likely to be correlated with where the fighting is 
actually taking place, which in turn is correlated with Congressional spending flows. Yet, while 
fighting largely shifted out of New England after mid-1776 and into the Middle States thereafter, 
New England’s military commitment to the union using the first two measures in Table 9 
remained high—higher on average than that in the Middle States. Setting a revolutionary-fervor 
argument aside, the fact that Congressional spending increasingly involved supplying the army 
rather than just soldiers’ pay (the Commissary and Quartermaster Departments listed in Table 6) 
and that these supplies for an army fighting mainly in the Middle States were often drawn from 
New England and to a lesser extent from the Chesapeake States may help explain the strength of 
these states’ commitment to the union through the period.  
  On the other hand, the third measure in Table 9 likely reflects the locus of Congressional 
spending. States would find it difficult to acquire Continental Dollars via taxing their citizens if 
few Continental Dollars had been directly spent by Congress in their state. Significant amounts 
of Continental Dollars had been spent in Massachusetts and in the Middle States, if nothing else 
directly as soldiers’ pay. Thus it may not be surprising that Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and 
the Middle States dominated this measure of commitment to the union; it may have simply been 
a by-product of the locus of Congressional spending and thus the ease of compliance. Few 
Continental Dollars were spent in the Southern States, so it is not unreasonable to suppose that 
these states found it difficult to comply with their redemption quotas. 
Conclusions 
Geographic imbalances in national fiscal/monetary policy are important for 
understanding the American Revolution and its political aftermath. Federalism, confederations, 
and state commitment to a national government can be fragile and affected by how and where   20
resources are extracted compared with how and where those resources are spent. The analysis 
here helps foreshadow and explain the post-revolution difficulties of holding the union together, 
i.e. the difficulties in achieving a final financial accounting and accommodation across the states 
in paying for the revolution, the need to accommodate the Southern States in certain ways to 
hold them in the union, as well as explain the continuing rogue behavior of states such as Rhode 
Island and North Carolina. This analysis suggests that integrating the disunity created by the 
operation of the national fiscal structure during the revolution with the post-war struggle for 
political unity in the early republic might be a fruitful direction for future research.  
One outcome of this analysis is the hypothesis that monetary effects and price inflation 
were geographically varied. Most of Congress’ spending through 1779 was in the form of paper 
money. Given regionally targeted spending correlated with the theaters of war, local or at least 
regional differences in economic stimulus and price inflation should have occurred. These 
differences were unlikely to have been evened out over the entire country or arbitraged away 
quickly, especially given wartime disruptions to trade flows. As of now, this hypothesis cannot 
be tested or measured well because only one true price index currently exists that spans the years 
of the revolution, namely for Philadelphia (Bezanson 1951).
6  The analysis here indicates that 
caution should be used when generalizing from this Philadelphia price index to what was 
happening nationally to the Continental Dollar. Philadelphia and its hinterland from mid-1776 on 
may have experienced the brunt of Continental Dollar paper money injections and so been the 
leading indicator of, and suffered the most from, price inflation in Continental Dollars compared 
with other regions. The perspective offered here on the geographic imbalance in national 
fiscal/monetary policy provides direction to, and hints at the likely fruitfulness of, continued 
research using this approach to the financing the American Revolution.   21
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Table 1   Percentage Distribution across the States of Fiscal, Monetary, and Military Quotas, 1775-1783: 
 Congressional Resource and Revenue Demands  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    1780 % of  Initial    Recommended             Remaining     Funding 
    Population:  Continental  Nov. 22,       Troop Quota %         Continental              %   
    Total    Dollar (1775)  1777       _____________________   Dollar (1781)         Set 
    {White    Redemption  Funding                                   1779 &    Redemption        April 
State    only}    Quota %   %       1777         1778       1780      %        1783 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
New Hampshire      3.16         4.14       4.00        3.41         3.49        3.75            2.67         3.51 
      {3.96} 
 
Massachusetts        11.43     14.47     16.40      17.07       17.44      18.75          15.33       14.96 
  {14.17} 
 
Rhode Island      1.90        2.40       2.00        2.27         1.16        2.50            1.33         2.15 
      {2.28} 
 
Connecticut      7.43       8.27     12.00        9.09         9.30      10.00          11.33         8.81 
      {9.11} 
 
New York      9.29         8.27       4.00        4.55         5.81        6.25            5.00           8.55 
  {10.75} 
 
New Jersey      5.02        5.38       5.40        4.55         4.65        3.75            6.00         5.56 
      {5.86} 
 
Pennsylvania    11.77     12.41     12.40      13.64      11.62      13.75          15.33        13.68 
  {14.49} 
 
Delaware      1.63         1.24       1.20        1.14         1.16        1.25            1.13         1.50 
      {1.92} 
 
Maryland      8.83     10.34     10.40        9.09         9.30      10.00          10.53         9.43 
      {7.48} 
 
Virginia                 20.97     16.54     16.00      17.05       17.44      13.75          16.67         17.10 
  {16.11} 
 
North Carolina       10.08       8.27       5.00      10.23       10.47        7.50            6.67         7.27 
      {8.51} 
 
South Carolina         6.47       8.27     10.00        6.82         6.98        7.50            8.00         6.41 
      {3.76} 
 
Georgia            2.02       -----       1.20        1.14         1.16        1.25            -----         1.07 
      {1.60} 
 
Respective       2,708,369         $3,000,000         $5,000,000     59,840     44,892   83,520 $195,000,000  $1,500,000 
Totals           {2,204,949}                            (annually) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: Derived from Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2 (Washington DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 1168 (Maine was included in Massachusetts; Vermont in New York;   24
Kentucky in Virginia; and Tennessee in North Carolina for population counts); “Report of the Secretary of War—
Henry Knox—War-Office of the United States, May 10, 1790” which is listed as item E. in Joseph Nourse, 
“Statements of the Receipts and Expenditures of Public Monies, During the Administration of the Finances by 
Robert Morris,” submitted to the House of Representatives by the Treasury Department, Registrar’s Office, August 
30, 1790 and reprinted in Elizabeth M. Nuxoll and Mary A. Gallagher, eds.,  The Papers of Robert Morris, 1781-
1784 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), vol. 9, pp. 905-940; Ferguson (1973, vol. 1, pp. 193-
194); Journals of the Continental Congress [JCC hereafter] (vol. 9, p. 955; vol. 15, p. 1150; vol. 24, p. 259). 
Notes: The total amount of Continental Dollars that Congress thought it had emitted was $200 million—the last 
emission being 29 November of 1779, but due to an accounting error the actual total was $199,990,000 (Grubb 
2007, 2008b). The amount to be assigned to Georgia was left unstated and presumably reflects the difference 
between the $195 million sum and the total Congress thought it had emitted. Georgia, being invaded, may have also 
been excused from its quota and the $195 million total by June of 1781 may have reflected $5 million already paid 
in by the states. 
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Table 2   Major Theaters of War by Region, 1775-1781 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  Major    Major   Approximate 
  Campaigns   Battles   American  Forces  American 
Dates   Theater/Region  (Date)   Engaged   Commander 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
April 1775  New England   Siege of  1775:  16,000   George Washington 
Through  [Massachusetts,    Boston   1776:  10,000   George  Washington 




May 1776  Middle States   New York City 
Through  [New York,     (May-Nov. 1776)  19,000   George Washington 
1780    New Jersey,    Trenton/Princeton, NJ      
    Pennsylvania,   (Dec. 1776/Jan. 1777)   6,800   George Washington 
  Delaware]   Brandywine,  PA 
     (Sept.  1777)   11,000   George  Washington 
     G e r m a n t o w n ,   P A  
     (Oct.  1777)   11,000   George  Washington 
     S a r a t o g a ,   N Y  
     (Sept.-Oct.  1777)  11,000   Horatio  Gates 
     Monmouth,  NJ 
     (June  1778)   13,400   George  Washington 
 
     [Main  army  remained  in New Jersey, New York, and  
     Pennsylvania  until  Aug.  1781] 
 
1780   Southern States Charleston,  SC 
Through  [Maryland,    (May 1780)      5,000   Benjamin Lincoln 
1781    Virginia, North  Camden, SC 
    Carolina, South  (Aug. 1780)      3,052   Horatio Gates 
  Carolina,  Georgia]  Cowpens,  SC 
     (Jan.  1780)       1,040   Daniel  Morgan 
     Guilford  Court  House,  NC 
     (Mar.  1781)       4,400   Nathaniel  Greene 
     Hobkirk’s  Hill,  SC 
     (Apr.  1781)       1,551   Nathaniel  Greene 
     E u t a w   S p r i n g s ,   S C  
     (Sept.  1781)       2,200   Nathaniel  Greene 
     Y o r k t o w n ,   V A     
     (Sept.-Oct.  1781)      8,845   George  Washington 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: Esposito (1995, maps 4-9); Puls (2008); Tindall (1988, pp. 210-42).   26
Table 3   Continental Dollars Emitted by Congress, 1775-1779: Corrected Estimates of 
    Total Net New Emissions (Face Value)  
 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1775   June 22    $2,000,000      1778   July 30       5,000,000 
  July 25       1,000,000        September 5      5,000,000 
  November 29      3,000,000        September 26    10,000,100 
1776  February 17      3,937,220        November 4    10,000,100 
  May 9       5,000,000        December 14    10,000,100 
  July 22       5,000,000      1779  January 14      8,500,400 
  November 2      5,000,000        February 3      5,000,160 
1777  February 26      5,000,000        February 12      5,000,160 
  May 20      5,000,000        April 1       5,000,160 
  August 1      1,000,000        May 5     10,000,100 
  November 7      1,000,000        June 4     10,000,100 
  December 3      1,000,000        July 17     15,000,280 
1778  January 8      1,000,000        September 17    15,000,260 
  January 22      2,000,000        October 14      5,000,180 
  February 16      2,000,000        November 17    10,050,540 
  March 5      2,000,000        November 29    10,000,140 
  April 4       1,000,000      End of Emissions 
 April  11          5,000,000       ___________ 
  April 18         500,000      Total Cumulative 
  May 22      5,000,000      Net New Emissions 
  June 20      5,000,000      Outstanding:    199,990,000 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: Grubb (2007, 2008b); JCC (vol. 2, pp. 103, 105, 207; vol. 3, p. 390; vol. 4, pp. 32, 157, 
339; vol. 5, pp. 599, 651, 697; vol. 6, pp. 912, 918; vol. 7, pp. 161, 373; vol. 8, pp. 377-80, 597, 
646; vol. 9, pp. 873, 993; vol. 10, pp. 28, 82-83, 174-75, 223, 309, 337-38, 365; vol. 11, pp. 524, 
627, 731; vol. 12, pp. 884, 962, 1100, 1218; vol. 13, pp. 64, 139, 209, 408; vol. 14, pp. 548, 687-
88, 848-49; vol. 15, pp. 1019, 1053, 1076-77, 1171-72, 1285, 1324-25, 1436); Papers of the 
Continental Congress (m247, r146, i136, p. 647). 
Note: The date is the day Congress first authorized the emission listed.  
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Table 4   Percentage Distribution of Congressional Monies Spent, 1775-1779—Estimated by Source and 
 Measured in Continental Dollars (face value) 
 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source       1775       1776     1777     1778      1779       Total 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Continental  100.00%       99.03%   58.79%   74.69%   76.66%   76.68% 
Dollars Emitted 
 
Domestic Loans      0.00%        0.00%   33.20%       5.50%   16.62%   12.80% 
 
Foreign Loans      0.00%        0.97%      8.01%    19.81%      6.72%    10.52% 
And Gift Aid 
 
Total              $6,000,000          $19,122,420      $22,113,250          $85,017,038       $128,564,501      $260,817,209 
 





Sources: Derived from Table 3 above and Table 6 below.  
Notes: These yearly percentages are estimates in that the information on domestic loans was not kept by calendar 
year, so some cross-year overlaps were unavoidable, see Table 6. In addition, the monetary portion of the foreign aid 
that Congress could use to spend domestically is unknown, see Table 6. It is assumed here that all foreign loans and 
gift aid were in cash that Congress could spend, thus giving a biased low estimate to the Continental Dollar 
percentage of the budget. These numbers also exclude goods and services confiscated or otherwise acquired for 
IOU’s in the form of Quartermaster Notes, Warrants, and Certificates, see Table 6. Finally, the conversion factor for 
going from Continental Dollar face value to Spanish Dollar (specie value) are crude yearly averages, see Table 6.    28
Table 5   Congressional Troop Costs in just Soldier Salaries: Expressed in Continental Dollars (face value)  
    Per Year, 1775-1779 
 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          
         1775*      1776     1777     1778      1779 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Number of Men in     27,443      46,901    34,820     32,899      27,699 
Continental Pay 
 
Biased  Low  Annualized  $1,380,874 $8,106,346 $6,018,272 $5,686,247 $4,787,481 
Expected Troop Pay 
 
As a Percentage of    23.01%      42.81%      46.29%        8.95%        4.86% 
Continental Dollars 
Emitted that Year 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: Table 3 above; Knox (1790); JCC (vol. 2, pp. 89-90). 
Notes: * = 1775 is taken to cover only from June on. Congress set the monthly pay for troops in Continental pay on 
14 June 1775. The pay for privates through captains for a company consisting of 81 men sums to $582.25 per 
month. Annualized, this is $14,000 per company of 81 men per year in expect cost. This information is used to 
generate the annualized expect troop pay in the table. These numbers are biased low in that they do not include the 
pay for military personal above the rank of captain, nor do they include recruitment bonuses or any equipage cost.  
Not all troops were necessarily enlisted for the entire year, thus these number represent the expected cost if those 
enlisted that year in fact stayed enlisted for that year.   29
Table 6   Yearly Distribution of Congressional Spending by Type of Expense, 1775-1780 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Percentage of Total Spent per Year 
Type of 
Expense          June  1775-1776   1777   1778   1779   1780* 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Spending That Was Relatively “Current” War-Theater Specific 
 
Army  Recruiting,  Pay,  and   46.71%   36.45%   22.00%   10.55%   23.30% 
    Other Contingencies 
 
Commissary  Department   12.66   21.78   31.36   35.52   40.32 
  
Quartermaster  Department       3.82   11.86   26.59   37.94   16.88 
 
Clothing, Hospital, and      3.37      5.81      7.30      6.21      4.04 
    Prisoner Departments 
 
Special Expedition against Detroit         0           0      1.39           0           0 
 
 Sub-total  66.56   75.90   88.64   90.22   84.54 
 
 
2. Spending That Was Less “Current” War-Theater Specific 
 
Military Stores and            0      0.09      0.87      2.55      6.39 
    Barrack-master Departments   
 
Indian Affairs and      0.21      0.13      0.03      0.06      0.37 
    Post Office         
 
Contingent Expenses & Civil List    1.53      1.57      1.82      0.39      2.38 
 
Marine Committee      7.21      3.61      1.79      1.10      1.31 
 
Secret Committee        6.43      2.51           0           0           0 
 
Commercial Committee           0          0      0.54      0.56       0.61 
 
Advances to the States#    18.07    15.22      6.30      5.11      4.38 
 
 Sub-total  33.45   23.13   11.35       9.77   15.44 
   ______________________________________________________________________ 
Total Spending in  
Continental Dollars    $20,064,667      $26,426,333      $66,965,269       $149,703,857       $82,908,320* 
(face value) 
 
Authorized Emissions of      $19,937,220       $18,000,000      $63,500,300         $98,552,480            0 
Continental Dollars     [June 1775—       [Nov. 1776—     [Jan. 1778—         [Jan. 1779— 
By Congress (face value)     July 1776]        Dec. 1777]       Dec. 1778]          Nov. 1779] 
 
Deficit of Continental 
Dollars (face value)           $127,447         $8,426,333        $3,464,969         $51,151,377       $82,908,320* 
 
   30
Made up for by: 
   Domestic Interest-Bearing        0         $7,342,275        $4,675,113         $21,372,021       $13,169,826 
   Loans (Bonds) in Continental           [Before        [Mar. 1778            [Sept. 1778         [Sept. 1779 to 
   Dollars (face value)              Mar. 1778]         to Sept. 1778]       to Sept. 1779]      Mar. 1780] 
 
Domestic Deficit in           $127,447         $1,084,058      +$1,210,144         $29,779,356       $69,738,494* 
Continental Dollars (face value)                [surplus] 
 
Made up for by (?): 
   Foreign Loans and Gift Aid      
   (In Spanish Dollars)**          $185,200            $590,325        $3,368,325              $432,000             $555,600 
   Converted to Continental 
   Dollars (face value)***          $185,200         $1,770,975      $16,841,625           $8,640,000       $22,224,000 
 
Residual Deficit—made up for by (?): 
   [Quartermaster Notes,          +$57,753             +$744,760    +$18,796,529           $2,342,827        $47,514,494* 
   Certificates, and Warrants       [surplus            [surplus            [surplus 
   (IOUs) in Continental            applied                 applied             applied  
   Dollars (face value)]            to 1777]            to 1778]         to 1779]                     
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: Table 3 above; Boyd (1954, vol. 10, pp. 42-43); Ferguson (1961, pp. 38-42); Grubb (2007, 2008a, 2008b); 
Jensen (1981, pp. 38-39); JCC (vol. 24, pp. 285-86);  Papers of the Continental Congress (microfilm #247, r146, 
il36, p. 647); all other derived from the Knox (1790).  
Notes:  * = only includes spending denominated in Continental Dollars of the old emission and not spending rated in 
the new Continental-State Dollar. Thus, 1780 is only a partial accounting.  # = I’m still trying to determine how 
much was channeled to states in the current war theater and how much was channeled to states outside the current 
war theater. ** = conversion of loan, subsidy, and gift amounts from livres into Spanish Dollars (specie) at the rate 
stated in the sources cited with apportionment across the years, while somewhat unclear, following Ferguson (1961, 
pp. 40-42) and Jensen (1981, pp. 38-39) as closely as possible with the Dutch loan and the Spanish gift-aid placed in 
1779, and the three million livres floating debt to individuals in Europe placed in 1780 somewhat arbitrarily. How 
much of the foreign loans were in cash versus in credit subsidies for foreign purchases is still to be determine. Thus, 
how much to count toward deficit balancing of domestic spending is unclear. The full amount is used here thus 
yielding a biased low estimate of the Residual Deficit. *** = Foreign Loans and Gifts are converted from Spanish 
Dollars (specie) to Continental Dollars following the depreciation table reported by Thomas Jefferson on 24 January 
1786, using either the average or the mid-year rate for each year, respectively (Boyd 1954, vol. 10, pp. 42-43). The 
conversion factors used are 0, 3, 5, 20, and 40 Continental Dollars to one Spanish Dollar for 1775-1776, 1777, 1778, 
1779, and 1780, respectively.   31
Table 7   Distribution of Troops Furnish Who Were in Continental Pay by State (san State militia), 1775-1780 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                 Absolute Numbers Furnish by Year 
        (As a Percentage of that States’ Required Quota)     Total 
           M e n -     Y e a r l y  
State    1775         1776  1777         1778  1779         1780  Years*  Average 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
New Hampshire    2,824          3,019   1,172          1,283    1,004          1,017   10,319       1,720 
          (57.5%)         (81.9%)   (64.1%)        (64.9%)     (67.1%) 
 
Massachusetts  16,444        13,372   7,816          7,010    6,287          4,453   55,382       9,230 
          (76.6)         (89.5)   (80.3)        (56.9)       (75.8) 
 
Rhode Island    1,193             798      548             630       507             915     4,591          765 
          (42.5)       (120.7)   (48.6)        (87.6)       (74.9) 
 
Connecticut    4,507          6,390    4,563         4,010    3,544         3,133    26,147      4,358 
           (83.9)        (96.0)   (84.9)        (75.0)       (85.0) 
 
New York    2,075          3,629    1,903         2,194    2,256         2,179    14,236      2,373 
           (67.0)        (84.1)   (86.4)        (83.5)       (80.3) 
 
New Jersey           0          3,193    1,408         1,586    1,276         1,105      8,568      1,428 
           (51.8)        (76.0)   (81.5)        (70.6)       (70.0) 
 
Pennsylvania       400          5,519    4,983         3,684    3,476         3,337    21,399      3,567 
           (61.1)        (70.6)   (60.5)        (58.1)       (62.6) 
 
Delaware           0             609       299            349       317           325      1,899         317 
           (44.0)        (66.9)   (60.7)        (62.3)       (58.5) 
 
Maryland           0             637    2,030         3,307    2,849         2,065    10,888      1,815 
           (37.3)        (79.2)   (68.2)        (49.5)       (58.6) 
 
Virginia            0         6,181    5,744         5,236    3,973         2,486    23,620      3,937 
           (56.3)        (66.9)   (69.2)        (43.3)       (58.9) 
 
North Carolina           0         1,134    1,281         1,287    1,214                 0      4,916         819 
           (20.9)        (27.4)   (38.8)          (0.0)       (21.8) 
 
South Carolina           0         2,069    1,650         1,650       909                 0      6,278      1,046 
           (40.4)        (52.7)   (29.0)          (0.0)       (30.5) 
 
Georgia            0            351    1,423            673         87                 0      2,534         422 
          (209.3)      (128.9)   (16.7)          (0.0)       (88.8) 
 
 
Sum Given  27,443       46,891  34,820       32,899  27,699        21,015      190,767       
[Column Total]        [46,901]                         [190,777]     31,796 
           (46.0%)      (73.3%)   (66.3%)       (50.3%)     (59.0%) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Derived from Knox (1790). 
Notes: * = treats all numbers as full year enlistments.    32
Table 8   Militia Furnish by the States, 1775-1780 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Absolute Numbers of Militia Furnish for Any Period of Time during Listed Year 
                (As a Ratio to Men Provided Who Were in Continental Pay)  
                                T o t a l     Y e a r l y  
State    1775         1776  1777         1778  1779        1780       Men-Years*  Average 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
New Hampshire           0           1,000    3,311             500       222           760     5,793          966 
          (0)       (0.331)          (2.825)       (0.390)  (0.221)      (0.747)   (0.561)    
 
Massachusetts           0          7,000    4,775          6,427    1,451        3,436   23,089       3,848 
          (0)       (0.524)           (0.611)       (0.917)  (0.231)     (0.772)   (0.417)   
 
Rhode Island           0          1,102    1,500          2,426       756               0     5,784          964 
          (0)       (1.381)           (2.737)       (3.851)  (1.491)            (0)   (1.260) 
 
Connecticut           0          6,737    2,000                 0           0           554     9,291       1,544 
          (0)       (1.054)           (0.438)              (0)         (0)     (0.177)   (0.355) 
 
New York            0          4,465    3,429                 0    1,500        2,668  12,062       2,010 
           (0)       (1.230)           (1.802)              (0)  (0.665)     (1.224)   (0.847) 
 
New Jersey           0          5,893    1,500          1,000           0           162    7,655       1,276 
          (0)       (1.846)           (1.065)        (0.631)         (0)     (0.147)   (0.893) 
 
Pennsylvania           0          4,876    4,481                 0           0               0    9,357       1,560 
          (0)       (0.884)           (0.899)              (0)         (0)            (0)   (0.437) 
 
Delaware           0             145    1,000                 0           0            231    1,376          229 
          (0)       (0.238)           (3.345)              (0)         (0)      (0.711)   (0.725) 
 
Maryland           0          2,592    5,535                 0           0               0    8,127       1,354 
          (0)       (4.069)           (2.727)              (0)         (0)            (0)   (0.746) 
 
Virginia     3,180                 0    5,269          2,600    4,600        4,500   20,149       3,358 
    (infinite)              (0)           (0.917)       (0.497)  (1.158)     (1.810)   (0.853) 
 
North Carolina    2,000          3,000          0                 0     3,706         3,000   11,706       1,951 
    (infinite)       (2.646)                  (0)              (0)  (3.053)    (inifinte)   (2.381) 
 
South Carolina    4,000          4,000       350          2,000     4,500         6,000   20,850       3,475 
    (infinite)       (1.933)           (0.212)       (1.212)  (4.951)    (infinite)   (3.321) 
 
Georgia     1,000           1,950       750          3,200        750            750     8,400       1,400 
    (infinite)        (5.556)          (0.527)       (4.755)  (8.621)    (infinite)   (3.315) 
 
 
Totals    10,180         42,760  33,900        18,153  17,485        22,061      144,539    24,089       
    (0.371)         (0.910)          (0.974)       (0.552)  (0.631)        (1.050)   (0.758) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Derived from Knox (1790); and Table 5 above.  
Notes: * = treats all numbers as full year enlistments, when they typically were not—often only 2 to 6 months.   33
Table 9   Index of State Commitment to the Union, 1775-1784 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Compliance with      Continental Troops  Quota of Continental  Commitment Index: 
    Continental Troop     versus Local     Dollars Remitted to  Un-weighted Arithmetic 
    Quota 1777-1780      Militia 1775-1780  Congress by 1784  Index (Simple Average) 
State/Region   %   %    %    % 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Estimated Relative Share of Congressional Spending Flows to: Moderately High 
 
New  Hampshire   67.1   64.0    100.0    77.0 
 
Massachusetts   75.8   70.6    100.0    82.1 
 
Rhode  Island   74.9   44.2            0.0    39.7 
 
Connecticut   85.0   73.8            0.0    52.9 
   ____   ____    _____    ____ 
     New England    75.7   63.2        50.0    62.9 
     Sub-total 
 
    Estimated Relative Share of Congressional Spending Flows to: High 
 
New  York   80.3   54.1        20.0    51.2 
 
New  Jersey   70.0   52.8        58.0    60.3 
 
Pennsylvania   62.6   69.6        92.0    74.7 
 
Delaware   58.5   58.1    100.0    72.2 
   ____   ____    _____    ____ 
     Middle States    67.9   58.7        67.5    64.7 
     Sub-total 
 
    Estimated Relative Share of Congressional Spending Flows to: Low 
 
Maryland   58.5   57.3            0.0    38.6 
 
Virginia    58.9   54.0        20.0    44.3 
 
North  Carolina   21.8   29.6            0.0    17.1 
 
South  Carolina   30.5   23.1            0.0    17.9 
 
Georgia    88.8   23.2            0.0    37.3 
   ____   ____    _____    ____ 
     Southern States  51.7    37.4          4.0      31.0 
     Sub-total 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sources: Derived from Tables 7 and 8 above; Grubb (2008a).  
 
Notes: See text. Column one is the number of troops provided to the Continental army as a percentage of the quota 
of troops requested. This quota was set roughly proportional to the state’s population in the union. Column two is   34
the percentage of troops provided to the Continental army as a percentage of total troops raised in the state (local 
militia and Continental troops). Column three is the total Continental Dollars each state taxed out of circulation and 
remitted to Congress as a percentage of the quota of payments requested. This quota was set roughly proportional to 
the state’s population in the union. Column four is a simple un-weighted average of the columns one, two and three. 
The regional averages are simple un-weighted averages.  
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Footnotes 
                                                 
     
1 Maryland refused to ratify the Articles, which required unanimity, until other states had 
ceded their claims to vast lands west of the Appalachian Mountains to the national government.  
     
2 The unexpected cost and duration of the war led to new emissions being continually 
authorized before any of the prior emissions were redeemed, which in turn led to a rapid 
accumulation of Continental Dollars outstanding in the economy. Between the first authorization 
in June of 1775 and the last in November of 1779, just under $200 million (face value) were 
emitted. All were still outstanding as of the beginning of 1780 as state redemptions of 
Continental Dollars were not required to begin until 1780. This was a lot of paper money. By 
1780 it averaged $91 per capita (of white population) face value, or the equivalent of about 20 
pounds in sterling equivalents (in face value).  By contrast, the money stock of the colonies 
before the revolution averaged around 1 pound sterling-equivalents per capita and between 1795 
and 1830 the U.S. money stock averaged around 1.8 pounds sterling- equivalents per capita 
(Rousseau 2006). Needless to say, depreciation set in and prices rapidly inflated. By 1780 the 
Continental Dollar was circulating at around 40 paper dollars to 1 dollar in specie and would 
rapidly sink further. By mid-1781 it had ceased to circulate (Grubb 2007, 2008a, 2008b). 
     
3 See Grubb (2007) for discussions of these monetary reform efforts.  
     
4 A variant of this report is reproduced in, but not analyzed by, Carp (1984, p. 69) and 
Ferguson (1961, pp. 28-29). The numbers reported are clearly the same as those in the Knox 
(1790) report. 
     
5 See footnote 4.   36
                                                                                                                                                             
     
6 The other state and regional tables of depreciation of Continental Dollars are not price 
indices or even based on contemporaneous data, but were retroactively created depreciation 
tables to aid in financial adjustments for breach-of-contract debt cases (Grubb 2007, 2008a). 